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Decisions Between Incompletely Informed Agents:
A Basic Rating Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1–16
V. Bieta
Abstract
In the paper the thesis is taken that ratings are strategic games. In a simple
non-cooperative bargaining game we substantiate our claim firstly by establishing a
sequential equilibrium and secondly by deriving some of its properties. We show how
negotiations prevent a conflict and how bargaining power terminates it. Further,
our model includes the decision to begin a conflict as well as the decision to continue
it. Finally, we get insights from the model for further research.
Cost Sharing in Electricity Transmission Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17–30
B. Dong, Y.Wang
Abstract
We propose a dual serial cost sharing rule for allocating the joint cost among a
group of agents demanding a single homogeneous good. This serial rule combines
the Moulin-Shenker’s rule with its dual and allows it to depend on the variable
returns of the cost function. This rule protects the larger demand agents when the
production has increasing returns, i.e., when the cost functions are concave. On the
other hand, when the technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, i.e., the cost
function becomes convex, it becomes the serial rule, which protects smaller demands.
A single formula can combine the serial and the dual serial into a single rule. The
proposed dual serial rule can be applied to a transmission capacity constrained
electric power grid, to restore correct incentive in network expansion.
Fixed Benefit Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31–44
V. Fragnelli, M.E. Marina
Abstract
We consider a problem in which a set of agents set up a joint venture, paying
a cost and receiving a benefit. In our situation the cost depends on the agents
involved, while the benefit is fixed.
Many well-known economic situations and problems fit this model: we can men-
tion minimum cost connection, production, bankruptcy and co-insurance.
We want to investigate how the agents may share the benefit, taking into ac-
count their charges of the costs, so we analyze the behavior of some classical solution
concepts and properties when the value of the benefit varies.
Resource Extraction Activity: an Intergenerational Approach . . . . . . . . 45–56
L. Grilli
Abstract
In this paper we study a differential game, for resource extraction of a renewable
good, in which players are overlapping generations of extractors. The framework of
overlapping generations allows us to consider intragenerational (players in the same
generation) and intergenerational (players in different generations) game equilib-
rium. We consider the case in which old extractors face lower costs than young
competitors and this will result in an advantage in strategies for old generation
which compensate partially the reduced marginal resource rent. Since we consider
overlapping generations, players have asynchronous horizons, in contrast with a
number of studies in intertemporal exploitation of resources in which players have
identical time horizons. We obtain the values function and strategies for extractors
both for young generation and for old generations.
Information Protocols and Extensive Games
in Inductive Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57–84
M. Kaneko, J. J. Kline
Abstract
We introduce a new mathematical representation of an extensive game situation,
called an information protocol, without using the hypothetical underlying structure
of nodes and branches. Its necessity has been emerging in our study of inductive
game theory. It has two main differences from a standard extensive game: one is the
use of information pieces (symbolic expressions) rather than information sets, and
the other is the replacement of a game tree by a causal relation. We will give a set of
axioms to show that our new formulation is equivalent to an extensive game. Also,
by deleting some axioms, we can capture some weaker forms of extensive games,
which are crucial to describing inductive game theory. Some theoretical results
for inductive game theory become drastically simplified in the present formulation
relative to previous formulations by the authors relying on extensive games.
Uncertainty Aversion and a Theory of Incomplete Contract . . . . . . . . 85–104
C. Ma
Abstract
This paper is to provide a theoretical foundation of incomplete contract in an
extensive game of multi-agent interaction. It aims to explain why rational agents
may agree upon incomplete contracts even though it is costless to sign a complete
one. It is argued that an incomplete contract creates strategic uncertainty. If agents’
attitudes toward uncertainty are not neutral, then an incomplete contract as final
solution can be the consequence of common knowledge of rationality. This paper
assumes that all agents are uncertainty averse in a sense of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989); and that agents can form coalitions as part of strategic play. All these are
embedded into a newly proposed equilibrium solution concept for extensive form
game of perfect information.
Bioresource Management Problem with Changing Area for Fishery 105–114
V.V. Mazalov, A.N. Rettieva
Abstract
A dynamic game model related to bioresource management problem (fish catch-
ing) is considered. The center (state), which determines a share of prohibited for
catching (reserved) area of a reservoir, and the player (fishing firm), which harvests
the fish stock, are the participants of the game. The paper continues the series of
authors’ papers where the approach of optimal harvesting with changing area for
fishing was developed. The model allowing a migratory exchanges between the two
parts of the reservoir is considered. Steady state solutions and Nash equilibria are
determined for finite and infinite planning horizons.
Associated Consistency Based on Utility Functions of Coalitions . . . 115–126
N.I. Naumova
Abstract
A cooperative game problem is treated as a bargaining problem with claim point.
For given continuous strictly increasing utility functions of coalitions, we suppose
that for every partition of the player set, equal sacrifice w.r.t. these functions overes-
timation of characteristic function values for partition members does not change the
result. This supposition and continuity assumption lead to a special value and give
an iterative method for computation its results. In particular, for equal logarithmic
utility functions of coalitions, we get proportional overestimation of characteris-
tic functions for partition members and the value is the weighted entropy solution.
The anonymity assumption and the ”dummy” property give the Shapley value. The
weighted entropy solution follows from the positive homogeneity assumption.
On the Not-Preference-Based Hoede-Bakker Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127–142
A. Rusinowska
Abstract
The paper concerns a certain modification of the generalized Hoede-Bakker index
- a notion defined for a social network of players. In the original Hoede-Bakker
set up, preferences of players are involved. It is assumed that a player has an
inclination either to accept or to reject a proposal, but due to the influence of
others, his final decision may be different from his original inclination. In this
paper, we propose the not-preference-based (NPB) generalized Hoede-Bakker index,
where feasible strategies instead of players’ inclinations are considered. We show
that if all feasible strategy profiles are equally probable, then the NPB generalized
Hoede-Bakker index is a ‘net’ Success, i.e., ‘Success - Failure’, where Success and
Failure of a player is defined as the probability that the player is successful and fails,
respectively. Moreover, under the assumption of equal probabilities of all feasible
strategy profiles, we show that the probability that a player is lucky (Luck) equals
the probability that he fails (Failure). Since Success - Luck = Decisiveness, it follows
that, under the same assumption, the NPB generalized Hoede-Bakker index is equal
to the probability that a player is decisive.
The Differential Game with ”a Survival Zone” with
Different Classes of Admissible Control Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143–150
B.T. Samatov
Abstract
The paper is devoted to the R. Isaacs game with ”a survival zone”, when ad-
missible control functions of Pursuers team belong to L2 and admissible control
functions of the Evader belong to L∞ . Dynamics of attainability domain of players
are investigated. It is shown that on the plane they are inner of Gartesians oval or
loop of Pascals snail.
An Overall-coalitional Marginalistic Value for Set Games . . . . . . . . . . 151–164
H. Sun, G. Xu and T. Driessen
Abstract
A new value by allocating, to any player, the items (taken from a universe) that
are attainable for the player, but cannot be blocked (by any coalition not containing
the player), is introduced in this paper. The resulting value for set games turns
out to be main tool in order to characterize the family of set game solutions that
possess a so-called potential representation. An axiomatization of this value, called
overall-coalitional marginalistic value, is given by three properties, namely a kind
of efficiency property, the equal treatment property and a kind of monotonicity
property.
Game-theoretic Study of Divisible Good Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165–182
A.A. Vasin, P.A. Vasina
Abstract
This paper considers different supply function auctions in a market for a divis-
ible good. We study problems of existence, uniqueness and computation of Nash
equilibria for these models. We also obtain an estimate of the Nash equilibrium
deviation from the Walrasian equilibrium for each variant. We consider the prob-
lem of the optimal auction organization from the point of view of the social welfare
maximization. We apply our results to the electricity market in Russia.
Innovation Game with Large Entrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183–202
Z. Wu
Abstract
Two game models, all named as innovation game with large entrants, are con-
structed to analyze the innovator’s behavior facing the large piracy. The basic model
mentioned first is based on the classical two stages complete information dynamic
game, and the second is new formed by this paper, which is considering the number
uncertainty of entrants, and is called game with entrant uncertainty in this paper.
The main result is that, in both of the two models, the innovation can always be the
equilibrium in the monopoly conditions, if the aggregate marginal effect of the indi-
rect influence from the initial investment to the innovator’s profit is strictly positive,
then the large entrants will not influence the monopolist’s innovation under certain
assumptions, both in the classical model and the new one. Two simple models with
linear payoff functions are considered specially, and we have got that the welfare
will be better off in the case without patent system than the case with one, and
the Innovation Equilibrium will always exist if the innovator’s production is non
negative, which can be fulfilled by implementing some monetary transfers.
A Solution Defined by Fine Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203–214
G. Xu, H. Sun, C. Hoede and T. Driessen
Abstract
Bumb and Hoede have shown that a cooperative game can be split into two
games, the reward game and the fine game, by considering the sign of quantities cvS
in the c-diagram of the game. One can then define a solution x for the original game
as x = xr − xf , where xr is a solution for the reward game and xf is a solution for
the fine game. Due to the distinction of cooperation rewards and fines, for allocating
the fines one may use another solution concept than for the rewards.
In this paper, a fine vector is introduced and a solution is defined by fine vec-
tors. The structure and properties of this solution are studied. And the solution is
characterized as the unique solution satisfying efficiency and f−potential property
(resp. f−balanced contributions property).
On the Stability of Oligopoly Model with a Cournot Fringe . . . . . . . . 215–224
L. Zu, J. Zhang and H. Wang
Abstract
In this paper, we study the size of the stable cartel by using a model which is
a symmetric oligopoly with Cournot fringe in which an industry’s cartel acts as a
Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms, behaving strategically rather than
as price takers, play the Cournot game after observing the quantity level set by the
leader. It probes into the relationship between profitability and stability. It also
examines how the size of the industry affects the size of a stable cartel. Existing
literatures on cartel stability have been huge. Konishi & Lin’s (1999) considered the
existence and of stable cartels, found that there are always non-empty stable cartels
with the general demand and cost functions based on the arguments of McManus
(1964) and D’Aspremont et al. (1983). They also employed simulation to confirm
their conjecture on what the size of stable cartel is, unfortunately, they were not
able to prove it formally due to algebraic complexity. The main contribution of
our paper is that it develops an analytical approach to show the size of the stable
cartel for an industry which has a finite number of firms. Moreover, it reveals that
Konishi & Lin’s (1999) conjecture, which is based on the results of simulation, is
incomplete.
